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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates cases when solutions to a mean field game (MFG) are non-unique.
The symmetric Markov perfect information N -player game is considered and restricted
to finite states and continuous time. The players’ transitions are random with a parame-
ter determined by their control. There is a unique joint distribution of the players for the
symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, but there can be multiple solutions to the MFG
equations. This thesis focuses on understanding the behaviors of the many MFG solu-
tions for the 2-state case. This thesis explores methods to determine which MFG solution
represents the fluid limit trajectories of the N -player system for large populations.
This thesis investigates the MFG map which acts on the MFG distributions and outputs
a prediction of the population’s distribution based on the expected response of any given
player. The MFG solutions are exactly the fixed points of the MFG map. The MFG so-
lution that approximates large population trajectories is conjectured to be the only stable
point for the MFG map. There is a second concept investigated, social cost, which is the av-
erage accumulated cost per player. But as is shown, the social cost is not a good indicator
of which MFG solution approximates large population trajectories.
A set, called the bifurcation set, is defined by there being some possibility of multiple
trajectories of a large population. Another important set is the indifference set, which in-
dicates when the transition rate of the players to a state is positively reinforced by an
increase of the empirical distribution of that state. However, numerical results are given,
indicating that the fluid limit trajectory may relate to stability of the MFG map. It appears
the MFG map is difficult to handle in many ways; stability of the mapping is difficult to
show, even in a simple example and there are numerical anomalies such that non-fixed
points appear to be numerically stable under rigorous tests.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS
• Let ∆i : Rd → Rd be the difference operator on i ∈ N, given by ∆iz =

z1 − zi
z2 − zi
...
zd − zi

• N0 = N ∪ {0}
• R+ = {x ∈ R : x > 0}
• R+0 = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}
• t ∨ s = max{t, s}
• t ∧ s = min{t, s}
• MFG means "mean field games"
• ITVP means "initial-terminal value problem"
• IVP means "initial value problem"
• TVP means "terminal value problem"
• IC means "initial condition"
• TC means "terminal condition"
• ITC means "initial-terminal condition"
• CTCS means "continuous time continuous states"
• CTDS means "continuous time discrete states"
vi
1 INTRODUCTION
Mean field game (MFG) theory is the study of decision-making policies for a large num-
ber of rational players, each with relatively small influence on the population’s distribu-
tion over the states of a game. The MFG was discovered in 2006 by Huang, Malhame,
and Caines [1], and independently by Lasry and P. L. Lions in 2007 [2]. In Huang et
al. [1] and Lasry et al. [2] continuous state continuous time (CSCT) models are considered,
and the analysis is based on the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) and the Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov equations. The MFG model has applications in optimal control theory, eco-
nomics, engineering, and social planning [3], [4], [5], [6].
The purpose of MFGs is to approximate the trajectory of a large population’s distribu-
tion over the states in the game. The symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for the N -
player game requires that each player considers the options of the other players, the num-
ber of considerations is combinatorially explosive. This can be rectified for large popula-
tions by instead working with the mean field game system, which does not depend on the
number of players. There has been much work examining under what conditions the limit
trajectories converge to a unique solution of the MFG system, see [1], [2], [7], [8], [9], [10]
and especially [3]. In this thesis, the primary interest is for non-unique solutions to the
MFG, in particular contrasting the different solutions to determine the approximate tra-
jectory of a large population. In the work of Yin, Mehta, Meyn, and Shanbhag [11] in 2012,
an MFG (oscillator) model is shown to have non-unique solutions.
Chapter 2 adopts the discrete state continuous time (DSCT) MFG model given by Gomes,
Mohr, and Souza in 2013 [7]. This system also includes the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) and the
Kolmogorov equations. Also, in this chapter, the objective of this research is given, which
(in short) is to analyze methods of parsing through multiple solutions of the MFG system
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to find which one models large populations. This thesis restricts attention to the 2-state
case with costs of a particular form. In Chapter 3, one tractable example of follow the
crowd type cost which has multiple solutions is thoroughly analyzed, and traits of the
different solutions are observed. Early on in this chapter, another tractable example of
avoid the crowd type cost is shown to have a unique solution despite that it fails the suf-
ficient conditions laid out in Gomes et al. [7] for uniqueness. In Chapter 4, methods are
tested against different examples, illustrating the difficulties in numerically searching for
the limit trajectory when multiple solutions of the MFG exist. Early on in this chapter,
stability of the MFG solution is discussed for a particular case.
2
2 MEAN FIELD GAME OVERVIEW
The discrete state continuous time (DSCT) mean field game model, as given in Gomes
et al. [7], is adopted. This system includes Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations and the Kol-
mogorov equation. Theorem 2.1.1 in Gomes et al. [7] gives a method to solve for the
common equilibrium policies. The reduced 2-state model is given and refined, see (2.18),
and is used throughout this document. The objective of this research is to discover a
method for finding which of the multiple solutions of the MFG system models large pop-
ulations. In the final section of this chapter, Section 2.3, a proposed method for finding
the population’s trajectory is based on stability of the MFG map, and this is explored more
carefully in Chapter 4. A second viable method is described as the lowest social cost of
the MFG solutions, but is shown to fail.
2.1 Model
Consider a symmetric MarkovN -player game with perfect information, where each player
is in a state from a finite set of states Id = {1, ..., d} in continuous time and players adjust
their control in order to minimize their cost. The paper Gomes et al. [7], considers such
games, and analyzes the corresponding MFG. The setting of the MFG in Gomes et al. [7]
is paraphrased in this section.
Given a reference player, the set of probability distributions of other players among
the states is given by Sd. The control for a reference player is given by α ∈ (R+0 )d×d, it
describes the rate at which the player tries to move from one state to any other state. The
control function is α : [0, T ] → (R+0 )d×d. For convenience, define αj(i, t) := αij(t); this is
the control for the reference player to go from state i to state j.
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Consider the running cost c : Id×Sd×(R+0 )d → R given in Gomes et al. [7]. It is assumed
that c(i, θ, α) does not depend on αi, else a player may accumulate cost for trying to stay
in their current state. Both c and ∂c
∂α
are assumed to be Lipschitz continuous with respect
to θ. It is assumed that c(i, θ, α) is strongly convex in α, that is, for some γ > 0
c(i, θ, α′)− c(i, θ, α) ≥ ∇αc(i, θ, α) · (α′ − α) + γ‖α′ − α‖2.
The running cost is superlinear in αj , that is limαj→∞
c(i,θ,α)
‖α‖ → ∞ for j 6= i. There is a
terminal cost denoted as ψi(θ(T )) which is Lipschitz continuous with respect to θ(T ).
Before seeing how the N player game transpires, the game is reduced to a single ref-
erence player assuming that all other players’ trajectories are known. To a great extent
this simplifies the problem. The solution for the reference player is dependent only on
the variable distribution of all players over time. Suppose the empirical distribution of
the other players (not including the reference player) as a function of time is given by
θ : [0, T ] → Sd to the reference player. Thus the reference player’s control response de-
pends on future values of θ and hence the system is non-causal. Finally assume i is the
state of the reference player at time t. The cost-to-go for the reference player using a
control policy α = (α(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is given by
uθi (t, α) = Eα
[∫ T
t
c(is, θ(s), α(s))ds+ ψiT (θ(T ))
∣∣∣∣ it = i] , (2.1)
and transition rate of the reference player’s state is determined by the control α according
to the continuous time discrete state (CTDS) Markov process
P[it+h = j|it = i] = αij(t)h+ o(h). (2.2)
The value function or the minimal cost-to-go is
uθi (t) = min
α
{
uθi (t, α)
}
. (2.3)
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The control associated to the minimal cost-to-go is the rational player’s choice. Consider
the Legendre transform of the running cost
h(i, θ,∆iz) = min
α∈(R+0 )d
{c(i, θ, α) + α ·∆iz}. (2.4)
By convexity and superlinearity of the running cost, argmin
α∈(R+0 )d
{c(i, θ, α) + α · ∆iz} is well
defined at each coordinate except the ith coordinate, where there is no constraint at all
because c(i, θ, α) +α ·∆iz is independent of the αi coordinate. Hence the following is well
defined 
α∗(i, θ,∆iz) ∈ argmin
α∈(R+0 )d
{c(i, θ, α) + α ·∆iz}
α∗i,i(θ,∆iz) = −
∑
j 6=i α
∗
i,j(θ, z).
(2.5)
Given a single reference player and the distribution of the other players, θ, for all time,
consider the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) ordinary differential equations (ODE) with terminal
condition (TC) for the game

− d
dt
ui = h(i, θ,∆iu)
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )).
(2.6)
Suppose the distribution of the other players is not given, although at any given time
of the game all players can observe each of the N players’ current state. Suppose that the
non-reference players choose some strategy, and the reference player has the same objec-
tive as before, to minimize cost. Suppose that each player’s cost function is dependent
on the distribution of the other players and the player’s state. Since all players know that
they are playing against a rational population they will take into consideration the other
players’ strategies, causing the problem to be intractable. The relationships between the
N + 1 rational players are complex, because each player has to account for the other play-
ers’ expected behavior, but this prediction is recursive as the players know that the others
5
are making such an account. To model these N + 1 rational players a more complicated
system than (2.6) is required.
Suppose that there are N + 1 players. The reference player knows the other players’
strategy β. Suppose that i is the reference player’s state and n is the number of the other
N players in each state, that is n
N
∈ SdN = { nN ∈ Zd :
∑
i∈Id ni = N} is the distribution of
the other N players. The reference player wants to minimize cost-to-go, given by
uni (t, α, β) = Eα,β
[∫ T
t
c
(
is,
ns
N
,α
(
s, is,
ns
N
))
ds+ ψiT
(nT
N
)∣∣∣∣ it = i,nt = n] , (2.7)
where α is the reference player’s strategy.
Suppose that eij = ei − ej and ei is the i-th vector of the canonical basis of Rd. Let n be
so that n
N
∈ SdN where ni is the number of players in state i, not including the reference
player. The following determines the cost-to-go functions for the N + 1 rational players,
as given in Gomes et al. [7]

− d
dt
uni = h
(
i,
n
N
,∆iu
n
)
+
∑
k,j
nkβkj
(
n+ eik
N
, un+eiki
)(
u
n+ejk
i − uni
)
uni (T ) = ψi
( n
N
)
.
(2.8)
The transition rate of the reference player’s state for the N + 1 player game is determined
by the control α according to the continuous time discrete state (CTDS) Markov process
P[it+h = j|nt = n, it = i] = αij
( n
N
, un
)
h+ o(h), (2.9)
and the transition rates of the other N players are given by
P[nt+h = n+ ejk|nt = n, it = i] = nkβkj
(
n+ eik
N
, un+eik
)
h+ o(h). (2.10)
The control profile (α, α, ..., α) is a Nash equilibrium if α minimizes the quantity on the
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right-hand side of (2.7) for β = α. In Gomes et al. [7] it is shown that a Markov perfect
equilibrium exists, and (α∗, α∗, ..., α∗) is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
For large populations, given a marginal distribution of their actions and a small time
interval, the fraction of players who move from one state to another is approximated by
its expectation–by the law of large numbers. The motivation for MFG is, for large enough
populations, to predict the force of the masses on the individual. It is impossible to know
what any individual is doing, but the control for each individual is deterministic, given
the flow of the masses. The MFG model is such that each player has a cost-to-go given by
the HJ (or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation which depends on the populations’ trajec-
tory given in (2.6), while the entire populations’ trajectory adheres to the Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov equation determined by their cost-to-go. The MFG model given in Gomes
et al. [7] is 
− d
dt
ui = h(i, θ,∆iu), ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T ))
d
dt
θi =
∑
j
θjα
∗
j,i(θ,∆ju), θ(0) = θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]d, with
N∑
i=1
θ¯i = 1.
(2.11)
2.1.1 2-State Model
In this section (2.6), (2.8), and (2.11) are specialized to the 2-state case. The case of 2-states
allows for a one-dimensional representation of the population’s distribution. In general,
the 2-state case is equipped with the state space {0, 1} instead of {1, 2} (for convenience).
For θ ∈ [0, 1]2 and θ1 = 1− θ0, the vector θ is determined by either of its coordinates. Thus
in the 2-state case the distribution can be denoted by
 θ
1− θ
, where θ is the fraction of
players in state 0.
The running cost for a given player depends on the state, i, that the player is in, the
fraction, θ, of players in state 0, and the control, αi,1−i, from state i to state 1 − i. Assume
throughout this section that the form of the running cost is c(i, θ, α) = f(i, θ) + α2i,1−i/2.
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Equation (2.5) reduces to
α∗i,1−i(θ, z) = argmin
α∈(R+0 )2
{c(i, θ, α) + α ·∆iz}
α∗i,i(θ, z) = −α∗i,1−i(θ, z).
(2.12)
In Gomes et al. [7] a "verification theorem" was given for both cases of one reference
player against deterministic population and for N + 1 rational players. The proof uses
Dynkin’s formula. The result for one player given a deterministic population states that
given a solution u to (2.6), the α∗(·, u) which minimizes the Legendre transform of the
running cost is also the strategy used to minimize the cost-to-go.
Theorem 2.1.1 gives the optimal control α∗ for the 2-state case where the running cost
has the form c(i, θ, α) = f(i, θ) + α2i,1−i/2. This particular form of the running cost is used
throughout Chapters 3 and 4.
Theorem 2.1.1. Suppose that the running cost is of the form c(i, θ, α) = f(i, θ) + α2i,1−i/2, for
some fixed θ := θ[0,T ]. Then α∗(θ, u) minimizes uθi defined in (2.1). Moreover α∗ defined in (2.5)
is given by α∗i,1−i(θ, z) = (zi − z1−i)+.
Proof. See Gomes et al. [7] for proof that α∗(θ, u) minimizes the right-hand side of (2.1).
By definition
α∗i,1−i(θ, z) = argmin
α≥0
{c(i, θ, α) + αi,1−i(z1−i − zi)}
= argmin
α≥0
f(i, θ) +
α2i,1−i
2
+ αi,1−i(z1−i − zi)
= argmin
α≥0
(
1
2
α2i,1−i + (z1−i − zi)αi,1−i
)
= (zi − z1−i)+. (2.13)
When using the tractable form of running cost c(i, θ, α) = f(i, θ) + α2i,1−i/2; both (2.6)
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and (2.8) simplify. Given a distribution θ(t) for t ∈ [0, T ], (2.6) becomes

− d
dt
ui = f(i, θ)− 1
2
(ui − u1−i)2+
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )),
(2.14)
and hence the Markov transition probabilities are
P[it+h = 1− i|it = i] = (ui(t)− u1−i(t))+h+ o(h). (2.15)
System (2.8) is now
− d
dt
uni = f
(
i,
n
N
)
− 1
2
(uni − un1−i)2++
+ nα∗0,1
(
n− i
N
, un
)
[un+1i − uni ] + (N − n)α∗1,0
(
n+ 1− i
N
, un
)
[un−1i − uni ]
uni (T ) = ψi
( n
N
)
,
(2.16)
hence the transition rates are
P[it+h = 1− i|nt = n, it = i] = α∗i,1−i
( n
N
, un
)
h+ o(h),
P[nt+h = n− 1|nt = n, it = i] = nα∗0,1
(
n− i
N
, un−i
)
h+ o(h) and
P[nt+h = n+ 1|nt = n, it = i] = (N − n)α∗1,0
(
n+ 1− i
N
, un+1−i
)
h+ o(h). (2.17)
The MFG model given by (2.11) becomes

−u˙0 = f(0, θ)− 1
2
(u0 − u1)2+
−u˙1 = f(1, θ)− 1
2
(u1 − u0)2+
θ˙ = −θ(u0 − u1)+ + (1− θ)(u1 − u0)+
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )), θ(0) = θ¯ ∈ [0, 1].
(2.18)
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2.2 Objective of Study
In this section the objective of the study is outlined. A definition of fluid limit trajectory
is presented. The fluid limit trajectories are the trajectories this thesis considers most
meaningful. The bifurcation set, is a set where the number of fluid limit trajectories coming
from a single initial distribution is not one.
Definition 2.2.1. Consider the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for the N + 1 rational
player game given by (2.8)-(2.10), with all players using the strategy α∗ minimizing the average
cost in (2.7). Suppose that nN is the distribution of the N non-reference players with transition
rates (2.10). Suppose that θ : [0, T ]→ SdN .
Then θ is a fluid limit trajectory if for some {xN}∞N=1 with limN→∞ x
N
N
→ θ(0), the following
holds for any  > 0,
lim
N→∞
P
[∥∥∥∥nNN − θ
∥∥∥∥
∞
< 
∣∣∣∣nN(0) = xN] = 1. (2.19)
Consider the MFG model given by (2.11). Since this system is an ITVP, even Lipschitz
conditions are not enough to guarantee unique solutions. Indeed, solutions to mean field
games are not necessarily unique. Figure 2.1 gives an example of non-unique solutions
for the 2-state MFG given by (2.18). This example is thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 3.
When presented with multiple solutions there are two immediate questions.
1. Does one of the solutions to the MFG model given by (2.11) represent the fluid limit
trajectory determined by the transition rates given by (2.10)?
2. If so, how can it be determined which solutions of the MFG model given by (2.11)
represent the fluid limit trajectories given by (2.10), without directly computing the
fluid limit trajectory?
Both are open problems. In view of these questions, there is a relevant set of points that
dictate which MFG solutions are fluid limit trajectories over all times to play. If this set
10
Figure 2.1: Consider (2.18) with f(i, θ) = |θ − (1− i)| in the running cost, with initial terminal
conditions (ITC) θ(0) = 1/2 and ψi ≡ 0, and the time to play T = 3. On the left are two solutions
of θ, the fraction in state 0. On the right are the corresponding cost-to-go differences y := u1 − u0.
The solid lines in both graphs represent the fluid limit trajectory which is also an MFG solution.
Note that not all solutions of the MFG system are plotted.
was known, then any MFG solution can be determined to be a fluid limit trajectory based
on whether it crosses the set.
Definition 2.2.2. Consider the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for the N + 1 rational
player game given by (2.8). The bifurcation set is the set of points (T, µ) so that T > 0 is the
time to play and there is not exactly one fluid limit trajectories with initial distribution µ.
Conjecture 2.2.3. For any initial distribution there is at least one fluid limit trajectory, and all
fluid limit trajectories solve the MFG model given by (2.11). The fluid limit trajectories do not
cross the bifurcation set.
In Cardaliaguet et al. [3] it is proven that under certain conditions, for the continuous
state case, the trajectories of the N rational players to the solution of the MFG converge
in expectation. Unfortunately, uniqueness of the solution was one of the conditions as-
sumed.
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2.3 Methods for Fluid Limit Trajectories and MFG Solutions
In this section two analytic methods are discussed for the purpose of determining whether
a MFG solution for a given time to play is a fluid limit trajectory. The first is determining
the stable points of a particular mapping of population trajectories, the MFG map. The
question is whether the fluid limit trajectories are exactly the stable fixed points of the
MFG map. This is examined in more depth in Chapter 4, but an introduction to it is given
in Section 2.3.1. The second method is determining the MFG solution with the minimum
social cost which is covered in Section 2.3.2 where a conjectured method to find the fluid
limit trajectory is given and shown to fail.
2.3.1 Stability of the MFG Map
Suppose a politician were to give the future distribution, θ. Suppose that each player be-
lieved this politician. Then all players will develop the same policy which optimizes their
performance based on this assumed behavior. Each player’s policy is determined by (2.6),
and their trajectory flows according to (2.2). The MFG map is derived by using the Kol-
mogorov equation to determine the resulting flow of the population’s distribution. The
MFG map is discussed in Gomes et al. [7], with notation ξ, to show existence of MFG so-
lutions. The purpose was not to look at properties of stability nor to distinguish between
multiple MFG solutions for the fluid limit trajectory. The following is the definition of the
MFG map.
Definition 2.3.1. Consider the MFG model given by (2.11) given a time to play T and running
cost c. Suppose that a predicted fractional population trajectory θ := (θ(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is given.
Define the MFG map, denoted Φ, on θ as the solution to

d
dt
θ˜i =
∑
j
θ˜jα
∗
j,i(θ˜,∆ju),
θ˜(0) = θ(0),
(2.20)
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where the vector function u := (uc,T,θ(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is the solution to
− d
dt
ui = h(i, θ,∆iu)
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )).
(2.21)
That is Φ(θ) = θ˜.
The functions (θ, u) solve the MFG if and only if Φ(θ) = θ. In other words, the MFG
solutions are exactly the fixed points of the MFG map. The following conjecture is inves-
tigated in Chapter 4.
Conjecture 2.3.2. The stable fixed points of the MFG map Φ are exactly the fluid limit trajectories.
Given a prediction θ there is no guarantee that limn→∞Φn(θ) exists (Φn is the n-fold
composition of Φ). In fact, there are examples where Φn(θ) oscillates between two func-
tions, and a prediction θ can be above the bifurcation set while the map Φ(θ) is below the
set. One such example, shown in Fig. 2.2, is for the MFG model given by (2.18) where
f(i, θ) = |1− i− θ|+ 8(θ − 0.75)1{θ>0.75} + 8(0.25− θ)1{θ<0.25}.
Recall the MFG map Φ. Define ΦM : θ 7→ M−1M θ + 1MΦ(θ), for any M ∈ N, and define
ΨM ≡ ΦMM . Suppose instead of applying Φn to the initial prediction θ, the map ΨnM is
applied for some M ∈ N, (Ψn is the n-fold compositions of Ψ). Because the steps are
smaller, the operation ΨM takes longer to compute than Φ, but it will not jump as far and
so is more likely to converge.
Recall the running cost function c(i, θ, α) = |1 − i − θ| + 8(θ − 0.75)1{θ>0.75} + 8(0.25 −
θ)1{θ<0.25} + α2i,1−i/2 from Section 2.3.1, and Fig. 2.2. The map ΨM is used instead of Φ to
illustrate stability of the MFG map Φ, see Fig. 2.3. It is conceivable that under sufficient
conditions Ψ := limM→∞ΨM exists, and has a form where stability of Ψ is more simple to
show than that of Φ. But no further analysis of ΨM is given here.
Examples exist (see Chapter 4 for details) with MFG solutions that are not fluid limit
13
Figure 2.2: Each plot contains multiple iterations of the MFG map applied to Φ to the same initial
distribution. In both plots the MFG has no terminal cost. To the left the running cost is
c(i, θ, α) = |1− i− θ|+ α2i,1−i/2. To the right the running cost is
c(i, θ, α) = |1− i− θ|+ 8(θ − 0.75)1{θ>0.75} + 8(0.25− θ)1{θ<0.25} + α2i,1−i/2.
There is non-negative initial prediction θ(t) = 0.5 + 0.25 sin2(2pit) given, plotted, in green. Then
the first 200 iterations of Φ are applied to the initial prediction and plotted, in blue. In red, on the
left is the limit of the converging sequence of functions; and also in red, on the right an additional
twenty iterations of Φ are plotted to illustrate that Φ2n(θ) and Φ2n+1(θ) appear to converge.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of improved convergence properties of Ψ vs Φ. The costs and initial
prediction are the same as in as in the second plot of Fig. 2.2. In blue are Ψn10(θ) for
n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 100}. In orange are Ψn10(θ) for n ∈ {101, 102, ..., 200}, which are oscillating. In red are
Ψn100Ψ
200
10 (θ) for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 100}.
14
trajectories but appear numerically stable. This behavior may be attributed to a numer-
ical phenomenon. Even worse examples exist attributed to this numerical phenomenon
where a non-fixed point of the MFG map is numerically stable, this appears to be very
common. Thus, finding MFG solutions that are not fluid limit trajectories, but which ap-
pear to be numerically stable, does not refute Conjecture 2.3.2 because the solutions could
be pseudo stable only. Due to examples like these, even if Conjecture 2.3.2 were proven
to be true, it is not immediately obvious how to find the fluid limit trajectories. This is all
discussed in Chapter 4, and moreover the Gâteaux derivative of Φ is exploited to analyze
stability of the mapping at an MFG solution in Chapter 4.
2.3.2 Social Cost of MFG Solution
The social cost of a MFG solution is the total cost per player averaged over all players. It
is well known that in a perfect information game there may be a Nash equilibrium which
is not optimal for the social cost, such as with the prisoners’ dilemma. One could ask the
less obvious question of whether or not a fluid limit trajectory has the lowest social cost
amongst all MFG solutions. It will be illustrated that the fluid limit trajectory does not
necessarily have smaller social cost than the MFG solutions.
Definition 2.3.3. Given a solution (θ, u) for the MFG model given by (2.11), the social cost is
given by
∑
i θi(0)ui(0).
Of course Nash equilibriums do not have to minimize social cost, and so one should
expect that there are population trajectories which have strictly smaller social cost than
all MFG solutions. But of the MFG solutions, all players are minimizing their expected
costs based on their knowledge of the other rational players. Hence it would not be too
surprising if the fluid limit trajectory was the MFG solution with the lowest social cost.
Suppose the number of players, N , is given and consider (2.18). Suppose the system
has time to play T = 3, running cost c(i, θ, α) = |1 − i − θ| + α2i,1−i/2, and terminal cost
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ψ0(θ) = 0 and ψ1(θ) = 0.3; see Fig. 2.4. Consider the set of points
UN = {(t, θ) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, 1] : un1 (t, θ)− un0 (t, θ) > 0}.
The largest value of θ for points in the complement of UN is about 0.3458, so giving the
players’ a strictly larger initial distribution say, θ = 0.375, guarantees that the trajectories
of the players are monotonically increasing. The fluid limit trajectory with this initial
distribution has the social cost of 1.10057 while one MFG solution has a lower social cost
of 1.04352.
The three MFG solutions for IC θ(0) = 69.5
201
≈ 0.3458 are shown in the top right plot of
Fig. 2.4, with their social costs. The top left plot is an illustration of UN where N = 200.
The set of points UN are in black and its complement in white. On the bottom the solid
line indicates the fluid limit trajectory, the dashed lines indicate the other MFG solutions.
The plot in the bottom left shows 20 trajectories with IC θ(0) = 70
201
and 20 trajectories
with IC θ(0) = 69
201
for the 201 rational player game. The bottom right shows plots of the
three MFG solutions overlaid with 50 trajectories given IC θ(0) = 75
201
of the 201 rational
players. The plot on the bottom right is thus a counterexample to the conjecture that the
MFG solution with smallest social cost is a fluid limit trajectory. The highest white point
is attained when the fraction of players in state 0 is about 0.3458. Observe that the fluid
limit trajectory does not have lowest social cost among the MFG solutions.
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Figure 2.4: Counterexample, showing that a fluid limit trajectory is not necessarily an MFG
solution with minimum social cost.
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3 ANALYSIS OF AN MFG WITH NON-UNIQUESOLUTIONS
This chapter focuses on the MFG model given by (2.18) for two tractable examples. In
both cases the form of the running cost is c(i, θ, α) = f(i, θ)+α2i,1−i/2 and there is no termi-
nal cost. Neither example satisfies the monotonicity conditions which guarantee unique-
ness shown in Gomes et al. [7]. Section 3.1 gives a model of a population which desires
to avoid the crowd. This example has a unique solution despite failing the aforemen-
tioned monotonicity condition. The avoid the crowd model acts as a contrasting model
to the follow the crowd model introduced in Section 3.2 which is the primary model of
this chapter. Section 3.3 is devoted to identifying the number of solutions to (3.5) and is
summarized in Theorem 3.3.1.
3.1 2-State Avoid the Crowd Case
The first case study is of the avoid the crowd kind, where the players try to avoid highly
congested areas. This will serve as a contrasting example to our later follow the crowd
populations. Taking a passage from Cardaliaguet et al. [3], "The interpretation of the
monotonicity condition is that the players dislike congested areas and favor configura-
tions in which they are more scattered." However, Cardaliaguet et al. [3] worked with
continuous states and their monotonicity conditions are different than in Gomes et al. [7].
Nevertheless, the previous quote may serve as an indication of what might be expected
in the discrete state case.
In this section assume the running cost function is given by c(i, θ, α) = |i− θ|+α2i,1−i/2.
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Figure 3.1: Symmetric avoid the crowd solutions. Given an initial condition (IC) and time to play
T , a solution to (3.1) would simply follow the contour. Uniqueness is indicated in the picture, as
the contours do not cross.
With this cost, (2.18) becomes
−u˙0 = θ − 1
2
(u0 − u1)2+, u0(T ) = 0
−u˙1 = 1− θ − 1
2
(u1 − u0)2+, u1(T ) = 0
θ˙ = −θ(u0 − u1)+ + (1− θ)(u1 − u0)+, θ(0) = θ¯.
(3.1)
One of the monotonicity conditions outlined in Gomes et al. [7] is not satisfied by (3.1),
despite its avoid the crowd type running cost. Still, the tractable (3.1) has a unique solu-
tion; see Fig. 3.1.
Assumption 1: The first assumption is simply
∑
i
(θi − θ˜i)(ψi(θ)− ψi(θ˜)) ≥ 0.
This assumption is trivially satisfied by (3.1) because ψ ≡ 0.
Assumption 2: Consider the orthogonal projection, P , which projects onto the comple-
ment of the one dimensional vector space containing 1. The assumption is that for any
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M > 0 there exists a γi > 0 so that if ‖Pz‖ ≤M then
h(i, θ,∆iz)− h(i, θ,∆iw)− α∗(i, θ, w) · (∆iz −∆iw) ≤ −γi‖∆iz −∆iw‖2.
For (3.2), if (zi − z1−i), (wi − w1−i) < 0 then
h(i, θ,∆iz)− h(i, θ,∆iw)− α∗(i, θ, w) · (∆iz −∆iw)
= −(zi − z1−i)
2
+
2
+
(wi − w1−i)2+
2
− (wi − w1−i)+((z1−i − zi)− (w1−i − wi))
= 0
> −γi((z1−i − zi)− (w1−i − wi))2.
Hence this condition fails.
Assumption 3: Define
h(θ, z) :=
h(0, θ,∆0z)
h(1, θ,∆1z)
 =
 θ − 12(z0 − z1)2+
1− θ − 1
2
(z1 − z0)2+
 .
There exists γ > 0 so that for θ, θ˜ ∈ [0, 1]
 θ
1− θ
 · (h(θ˜, z)− h(θ, z)) +
 θ˜
1− θ˜
 · (h(θ, z˜)− h(θ˜, z˜)) ≤ −γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 θ
1− θ
−
 θ˜
1− θ˜
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
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The cost passes this condition for γ = 1 because
 θ
1− θ
 · (h(θ˜, z)− h(θ, z)) +
 θ˜
1− θ˜
 · (h(θ, z˜)− h(θ˜, z˜)) =
=
 θ
1− θ
 ·
θ˜ − θ
θ − θ˜
+
 θ˜
1− θ˜
 ·
θ − θ˜
θ˜ − θ

= −2(θ − θ˜)2
= −
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 θ
1− θ
−
 θ˜
1− θ˜
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Since Assumption 2 above fails, the result of Gomes et al. [7] giving uniqueness does not
apply. Nevertheless, solutions to the initial-terminal value problem (ITVP) given by (3.1)
are unique as will be shown. As the goal is to understand θ not u, a simplification of (3.1)
can be used. Let y = u1 − u0. Then by (3.1)
−y˙ = −u˙1 + u˙0
= 1− 2θ − 1
2
y2+ +
1
2
(−y)2+
= 1− 2θ − 1
2
y|y|.
Also let x = 2θ − 1 and so x0 = 2θ¯ − 1. Then
x˙ = 2θ˙
= 2(1− θ)y+ − 2θ(−y)+
= −(x− 1)y+ − (x+ 1)(−y)+
= y − x|y|.
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The following system is analyzed in place of (3.1), where θ = 1+x
2
−y˙ = −x− 1
2
y|y|, y(T ) = 0
x˙ = y − x|y|, x(0) = x0 ∈ [−1, 1].
(3.2)
The associated TVP allows for finding solutions which guarantee that y(T ) = 0, which
must always be true. For convenience look at time in reverse from T , that is to map
t 7→ T − t. Moving backwards and with initial conditions and forgetting the condition x0,
then (3.2) becomes 
y˙ = −x− 1
2
y|y|, y(0) = 0
x˙ = −y + x|y|, x(0) =  ∈ [−1, 1].
(3.3)
If (x, y) solved (3.3) then y¨ = −x˙ − y˙|y| = y − x|y| + x|y| + 1
2
y3 = y + 1
2
y3. So y solves the
following with y˙(0) = x(0) 
y˙ = v, y(0) = 0
v˙ = y +
1
2
y3, v(0) =  ∈ [0, 1].
(3.4)
Local Lipschitz continuity of the right-hand side of (3.3) implies uniqueness, given a
time interval where solutions are bounded. Time intervals so that solutions to (3.3) blow
up are not considered, because in (3.2) the only interest is for solutions (x, y) such that
x ∈ [−1, 1], and y cannot blow up while x is bounded.
Lemma 3.1.1. Suppose (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) solve (3.3) with x1(0) > x2(0) ∈ [−1, 1]. Suppose
that neither solution blows up on [0, τ ]. Then x1 > x2 on [0, τ ].
Proof. Assume (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) solve (3.3) with x1(0) > x2(0) ∈ [−1, 1], and that neither
solution blows up on [0, τ ]. Then (yi, y˙i) solves (3.4), where y˙i(0) = −xi(0) for i = 1, 2. It
will be shown that y1(t) < y2(t) for t ∈ [0, τ ] first, then that x1 > x2.
First note that y˙2(0) = x2(0) > x1(0) = y˙1(0). Suppose there exists a t∗ ∈ [0, τ ] so
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that y2(t∗) = y1(t∗) and y2(t) > y1(t) for any t ∈ (0, t∗). Then by (3.4), y¨2(t) > y¨1(t)
for any t ∈ (0, t∗), and thus y˙2(t) − y˙1(t) > y˙2(0) − y˙1(0) > 0 for any t ∈ (0, t∗). Then
y2(t
∗) − y1(t∗) > y2(0) − y1(0) = 0, a contradiction. Therefore y2(t) > y1(t), and hence
y˙2(t) > y˙1(t) for t ∈ [0, τ ].
Since y|y| is an increasing function, y1|y1| < y2|y2|. By (3.3), −xi = y˙i + 12yi|yi|. Therefore
one has −x1 = y˙1 + 12y1|y1| < y˙2 + 12y2|y2| = −x2, hence x1 > x2 for t ∈ [0, τ ] (see Fig. 3.1
for intuition).
The following theorem immediately follows.
Theorem 3.1.2. System (3.2) with x0 ∈ [−1, 1] for a given time to play T > 0 has a unique
solution.
Proof. Suppose that (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) solve (3.2) with x1(0) = x2(0) ∈ [−1, 1] and are
bounded on [0, T ]. Suppose that x1(T ) > x2(T ), then by Lemma 3.1.1 x1(t) > x2(t) for
t ∈ [0, T ], but this contradicts that x1(0) = x2(0). Same for x1(T ) < x2(T ).
Suppose that x1(T ) = x2(T ). Since (3.2) is locally Lipschitz and y1(T ) = y2(T ), x1 ≡ x2
on [0, T ]. Hence the conclusion.
3.2 Introduction to 2-State Follow the Crowd Case
In this section a case of follow the crowd for two states is introduced and some basic
properties are discussed. In particular, uniqueness of solutions to this MFG model does
not hold; see Fig. 2.1. Assume that the running cost is c(i, θ, α) = |1− i− θ|+α2i,1−i/2. For
this running cost function, (2.18) becomes

−u˙0 = 1− θ − 1
2
(u0 − u1)2+
−u˙1 = θ − 1
2
(u1 − u0)2+
θ˙ = −θ(u0 − u1)+ + (1− θ)(u1 − u0)+
ui(T ) = 0, θ(0) = θ¯.
(3.5)
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As in the previous section, the goal is to understand θ, and (as with the avoid the crowd
cost) (3.5) is simplified by assuming y = u1 − u0 and x = 2θ − 1. System (3.5) yields
−y˙ = −u˙1 + u˙0
= 2θ − 1− 1
2
y2+ +
1
2
(−y)2+
= x− 1
2
y|y|,
and
x˙ = 2θ˙
= 2(1− θ)y+ − 2θ(−y)+
= −(x− 1)y+ − (x+ 1)(−y)+
= y − x|y|.
Thus (3.5) simplifies to 
−y˙ = x− 1
2
y|y|, y(T ) = 0
x˙ = y − x|y|, x(0) = x0 ∈ [−1, 1].
(3.6)
Suppose that y(t) ≥ 0 on t ∈ [0, T ]. Then
dx
dt
(t) = y(1− x)(t)
=⇒ d[− ln(1− x)](t) = y(t)dt
=⇒ − ln(1− x(t)) + ln(1− x(0)) =
∫ t
0
y(r)dr
=⇒ 1− x(t)
1− x(0) = e
− ∫ t0 y(r)dr. (3.7)
Likewise 1+x(t)
1+x(0)
= e
∫ t
0 y(r)dr if y(t) ≤ 0 on t ∈ [0, T ].
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The conditions in Gomes et al. [7] for uniqueness of solutions to (3.6) again are con-
sidered. In addition to Assumption 2 failing as before, Assumption 3 also fails. Recall
that
h(θ, z) =
1− θ − 12(z0 − z1)2+
θ − 1
2
(z1 − z0)2+
 ,
and that Assumption 3 of the monotonicity conditions required that for θ, θ˜ ∈ [0, 1] and
γ > 0
 θ
1− θ
 · (h(θ˜, z)− h(θ, z)) +
 θ˜
1− θ˜
 · (h(θ, z˜)− h(θ˜, z˜)) ≤ −γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 θ
1− θ
−
 θ˜
1− θ˜
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
System (3.6) fails that condition because
 θ
1− θ
 · (h(θ˜, z)− h(θ, z)) +
 θ˜
1− θ˜
 · (h(θ, z˜)− h(θ˜, z˜)) =
=
 θ
1− θ
 ·
θ − θ˜
θ˜ − θ
+
 θ˜
1− θ˜
 ·
θ˜ − θ
θ − θ˜

= 2(θ − θ˜)2
> −γ2(θ − θ˜)2
= −γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 θ
1− θ
−
 θ˜
1− θ˜
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
In Chapter 2 the plot in Fig. 2.1 showed two solutions to the (3.5) with the same boundary
conditions. Understanding of the non-unique solutions x to (3.6) will be covered in the
next section.
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3.3 Non-Uniqueness Analysis of Follow the Crowd via TVP
The goal in this section is the proof of Theorem 3.3.1 below, which gives the number of
solutions to (3.5) given θ¯ = 1
2
and time to play T . The interest of θ¯ = 1
2
is due to the
fact that all non-constant solutions to (3.3) always eventually pass through 1
2
; see Lemma
3.3.7.
Theorem 3.3.1. System (3.5) with θ(0) = 1
2
and positive time to play T ∈ (pi
2
+ (k−1)pi, pi
2
+kpi]
for k ∈ N0, has exactly 1 + 2k solutions.
This section contains lemmas leading up to the proof of Theorem 3.3.1. Along the way
it is shown the solutions are periodic, after being analytically extended from [0, T ] to R.
There are monotonicity results of the solutions to (3.6) which are used in showing the
number of solutions to (3.5) is increasing (given θ(0) = 1/2) in T . There is a further
continuity result which ensures that the number of solutions to (3.5) are increasing in a
predictable way. However, the most important result leading to Theorem 3.3.1, is Lemma
3.3.16 which gives an asymptotic of a solution to (3.5) on a set.
The initial-terminal conditions given for (3.6) make it difficult to solve. Instead the con-
dition x(0) = x0 is dropped and a value for x(T ) is chosen, running the ODE backwards
in time. By symmetry of the cost functions over the states, it may be assumed that x(T )
is non-negative, and since x(T ) ∈ {0, 1} gives that x is constant, it may be assumed that
x(T ) ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the ODE substitute t 7→ T − t. Then (3.6) becomes
x˙ = −y + x|y|, x(0) ∈ [0, 1]
y˙ = x− 1
2
y|y|, y(0) = 0.
(3.8)
Definition 3.3.2. Consider the family of solution pairs (x, y) which solves (3.8) given initial
condition x(0) = . Define the function τX : (0, 1)→ R+ so that τX() = inf{t ≥ 0 : x(t) = 0}
for any  ∈ (0, 1). Define the function τY : (0, 1) → R+ so that τY () = inf{t > 0 : y(t) = 0}
for any  ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 3.2: On the left are many solutions with various IC to (3.8). The solutions overlap,
indicating that there are non-unique solutions to (3.6). On the right the periodicity is illustrated
for one such solution, for T = 20.
It is not immediately obvious that τX , τY are finite (hence well-defined), but this is
shown in Lemmas 3.3.8 and 3.3.9. Over the course of this section the following theorem
is shown.
Theorem 3.3.3. The functions τX , τY : (0, 1) → R+ are continuous and monotonically increas-
ing. They are bijective onto (pi
2
,∞) and (pi,∞) respectively.
Figure 3.2 indicates the periodicity of (3.8) and that the solutions can cross each other
indicating non-uniqueness of the ITVP. Analysis of (3.8) will shed light on the nature of
solutions to (3.5). Nevertheless, even (3.8) is not trivial to analyze.
An important observation is that y, where (x, y) solves (3.8), can be solved indepen-
dently of x. Consider the second derivative of y from (3.8),
y¨ = x˙− |y|y˙
= −y + x|y| − |y|
(
x− 1
2
y|y|
)
= −y + 1
2
y3 and y˙(0) = x(0).
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Figure 3.3: The phase plane for (3.9).
Then a solution (x, y) to (3.8) is such that y solves the following ODE with y˙(0) = x(0),
y¨ = −y + 1
2
y3
y(0) = 0, y˙(0) =  ∈ [0, 1].
(3.9)
The ODE given by (3.9) is well understood, see Fig. 3.3 for the phase plane, and may
be posed as a first-order system
y˙ = v, y(0) = 0
v˙ = −y + 1
2
y3, v(0) =  ∈ [0, 1].
(3.10)
Let
H(y, v) =
1
2
y2 − 1
8
y4 +
1
2
v2. (3.11)
Then H is the Hamiltonian for the dynamics given by (3.10). In other words, y˙ = Hv and
v˙ = −Hy. It follows that H is constant along solutions of the ODE.
Lemma 3.3.4. If (y, v) solves (3.10) then |y| ≤ √2 and |v| ≤ .
Proof. Let v(0) =  ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the level set of the Hamiltonian which contains the
point (0, ). The value of the Hamiltonian on this level set is H(0, ) = 1
2
2. Then the level
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set is given by
1
2
2 = H(y, v) =
1
2
y2 − 1
8
y4 +
1
2
v2
or y2(y2 − 4) = 4(v2 − 2). (3.12)
Recall that y(0) = 0 and v(0) = . Suppose that there exists t > 0 so that y(t) =
√
2.
Then the left-hand side of (3.12) is −4, but then −4 = 4(v2 − 2) or v2 = −1 + 2 which
is a contradiction because || < 1. Thus y(t) 6= √2 for all t. Likewise y(t) 6= −√2 for all
t. Therefore |y| < √2 for all t > 0 because of the IC y(0) = 0. Moreover, this means the
left-hand side of (3.12) is always non-positive hence |v| ≤ .
Lemma 3.3.5. If (y, v) solves (3.10) with v(0) =  ∈ [0, 1], then |y| =
√
2(1−√v2 + 1− 2).
Proof. Since the Hamiltonian is constant along the solution
H(y, v) =
1
2
2 =
1
2
y2 − 1
8
y4 +
1
2
v2
⇐⇒ 4v2 = y4 − 4y2 + 42 = (y2 − 2)2 − (2√1− 2)2
=⇒ 2− y2 =
√
4v2 +
(
2
√
1− 2
)2
= 2
√
v2 + 1− 2 because |y| <
√
2 by Lemma 3.3.4.
⇐⇒ |y| =
√
2(1−
√
v2 + 1− 2).
Remark 3.3.6. Assume that (x, y) solves (3.8). Then y solves (3.9) and (y, y˙) solves (3.10). A
point is a fixed point of (3.10) if and only if (y˙, v˙) = (0, 0). The zeros of−y+ 1
2
y3 are y = 0,±√2.
Thus there are three fixed points {(±√2, 0), (0, 0)}. The Jacobian of the right-hand side of (3.10)
at a point (y, v) is
J(y,v) =
 0 1
3
2
y2 − 1 0

so its eigenvalues satisfy λ2 − (3
2
y2 − 1) = 0. For the fixed points (±√2, 0) are saddles because
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the Jacobian has eigenvalues λ = ±√2. For the fixed point (0, 0) the Jacobian has eigenvalues
λ = ±i, thus the origin being stable of concentric orbits.
3.3.1 Prerequisite Properties of τX and τY
Throughout this section basic properties of the functions x, y, τX and τY are discovered
where (x, y) solves (3.8). The following lemma is given to classify the end point cases as
well as the majority case, for the IC.
Lemma 3.3.7. Suppose that y solves (3.9). If y˙(0) = 0 then y ≡ 0. If y˙(0) = 1 then y is
monotonic. If y˙(0) =  ∈ (0, 1) then y has a local max.
Proof. Assume y solves (3.9) with y˙(0) =  ∈ [0, 1]. Let v = y˙.
If  = 0 then by uniqueness y ≡ 0.
If  = 1, then v(0) = 1 and by Lemma 3.3.5 y2 = 2 − 2|v|, which contains the fixed
points (±√2, 0), see Remark 3.3.6. Thus y converges to either ±√2. In the first quadrant
of the phase plane y increases, and by Lemma 3.3.4 y <
√
2 so v decreases. Thus y is
monotonically increasing and y → √2 as t→∞.
Suppose that  ∈ (0, 1). Then by Lemma 3.3.5, |y| =
√
2(1−√v2 + 1− 2). Whenever
v = 0, |y| =
√
2(1−√1− 2) < √2. Thus y has no fixed point, and so y does not converge.
But since y is bounded it must not be monotone and hence must have a local max.
There are many straightforward properties of a solution y, such as periodicity, multiple
symmetries, and their signed regions. These are covered in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.8. Suppose that y solves (3.9) with IC y˙(0) =  ∈ (0, 1). Then y attains its first local
max at τY ()
2
. Furthermore y
(
τY ()
2
+ t
)
= y
(
τY ()
2
− t
)
for t ∈
[
0, τY ()
2
]
, y(t) = −y (τY () + t)
for t ≥ 0, and y has period 2τY (). Finally, y(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, τY ()) and y(t) < 0 for
t ∈ (τY (), 2τY ()).
Proof. Let T > 0 be the first time that y attains a local max. It will eventually be shown
that T = τY ()
2
, but first the properties of y will be shown using time T . By Lemma 3.3.7,
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T <∞. Note that solutions to (3.9) are unique, because y is bounded by Lemma 3.3.4 and
hence Lipschitz conditions apply. Define w+, w− for t ∈ [0, T ] so that w+(t) = y(T + t) and
w−(t) = y(T − t). Then
w¨+(t) = y¨(T + t) w¨−(t) = y¨(T − t)
w+(0) = y(T ) and w−(0) = y(T )
w˙+(0) = y˙(T ) = 0 w˙−(0) = −y˙(T ) = 0.
Since solutions to (3.9) are unique and w+ − w− solves (3.9) with  = 0, w+ ≡ w−. Thus
y(T + t) = y(T − t) for t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies that y(2T ) = y(0) = 0, or that τY () ≤ 2T .
Define z for t ∈ [0, 2T ] so that z(t) = −y(2T + t). Then
z¨(t) = −y¨(2T + t) = −
(
−y(2T + t) + 1
2
y(2T + t)3
)
= −z(t) + 1
2
z(t)3,
z(0) = −y(2T ) = 0 and z˙(0) = −y˙(2T ) = −w˙+(T ) = −w˙−(T ) = y˙(0). Thus y ≡ z, or
y(t) = −y(2T + t). Furthermore, y(t) = −y(2T + t) = y(4T + t) for t ≥ 0, so y has period
4T .
Since y˙(0) > 0 and by definition of T , y˙(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. So y(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ].
But since y(T + t) = y(T − t) for t ∈ [0, T ], it is in fact the case that y(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, 2T ).
Thus T = τY ()
2
. Hence the conclusion, because y(t) < 0 for t ∈ (τY (), 2τY ()) since
y(t) = −y(2T + t) for t ≥ 0.
Note that the Lemma 3.3.8 is obvious by the symmetries of the Hamiltonian given by
(3.11), and the proof above is simply an elaboration of this fact. Likewise the coordinate
x of (3.8) has properties of periodicity, symmetry, and regions of monotonicity.
Lemma 3.3.9. Suppose that (x, y) solves (3.8) with x(0) =  ∈ (0, 1). Then x(t) = −x(t+τY ()),
τX < τY and x and y have the same period 2τY (). Finally, x is strictly decreasing on (0, τY ())
and strictly increasing on (τY (), 2τY ()).
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Proof. Lemma 3.3.8 applies and so y is periodic, with period 2τY (). Also by Lemma 3.3.8
x(t) = y˙(t) +
1
2
y(t)|y(t)| = −y˙(t+ τY ())− 1
2
y(t+ τY ())|y(t+ τY ())| = −x(t+ τY ()).
(3.13)
Thus x(t) = −x(t+ τY ()) = x(t+ 2τY ()) and so x is periodic with period at most 2τY ().
Also τX() < τY () since x(0) = −x(τY ()).
By Lemma 3.3.8, y is positive on (0, τY ()). Since x˙ = −y + x|y| = −y(1 − x) < 0 on
(0, τY ()). Also x˙ > 0 on (τY (), 2τY ()) since x(t) = −x(t + τY ()). Thus x is strictly
decreasing on (0, τY ()) and x is strictly increasing on (τY (), 2τY ()). Therefore x has
period 2τY ().
The following remark shows convexity of the Hamiltonian’s contours, and gives an
implication.
Remark 3.3.10. Consider a solution to (3.9) with IC  ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that t ∈
(
0, τY ()
2
)
, then
by Lemma 3.3.8 both y(t), y˙(t) ≥ 0 and by Lemma 3.3.4 |y| < √2, so the slope of the curve in the
phase plane is
dy˙
dy
=
y¨
y˙
=
−y + 1
2
y3
y˙
, (3.14)
which is negative and decreasing as y increases and as y˙ decreases, hence the concavity of the curve
in the phase plane for t ∈
(
0, τY ()
2
)
. That is by (3.14), if t1, t2 ∈ (0, τY ()) with t1 < t2 then
dy˙
dy
(t1) >
dy˙
dy
(t2)
or
0 >
dy˙
dy
(t1) ≥ y˙(t2)− y˙(t1)
y(t2)− y(t1) . (3.15)
Equation (3.15) is eventually used to find the upper bound lim→0+ τY () ≤ pi. The lower
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bound of τY is found in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.11. For any , τY () > pi.
Proof. Consider a solution y to (3.9) with IC  ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that t ∈ (0, τY ()), then by
Lemma 3.3.8, y(t), y˙(t) ≥ 0. The angle at (y, y˙) as a function of time defined by
θ := arctan
(
y˙
y
)
,
satisfies
θ˙ =
1
1 + ( y˙
y
)2
y¨y − y˙y˙
y2
=
(−y + 1
2
y3
)
y − y˙y˙
y˙2 + y2
= −1 + 1
2
y4
y˙2 + y2
. (3.16)
Thus θ(t) ≥ θ(0) + ∫ t
0
−1ds = pi
2
− t, and so θ(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0, pi/2]. This means that the
first local max happens for some t ≥ pi
2
. Thus by Lemma 3.3.8, τY () > pi.
The next result gives a monotonicity of the solutions (x, y) to (3.8) with respect to the
IC, see Fig. 3.4.
Theorem 3.3.12. Let (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) be solutions to (3.8) with IC x1(0) = 1 and x2(0) = 2
in (0, 1) with x1(0) < x2(0). Then y1(t) < y2(t) for t ∈ (0, τY (1)). Moreover x1(t) < x2(t) for
t ∈ [0, τX(1)].
Proof. Recall that y1(t), y˙1(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, τY (1)/2), by Lemma 3.3.8. Define the functions
θ1 = arctan(
y˙1
y1
) and θ2 = arctan( y˙2y2 ).
Then θ˙1 = −1+12 y
2
1
1+
(
y˙1
y1
)2 , θ˙2 = −1+12 y22
1+
(
y˙2
y2
)2 ; see (3.16). Taking a limit gives θ˙1(0) < θ˙2(0).
Suppose that θ1(t∗) = θ2(t∗) and θ1(t) < θ2(t) for t ∈ (0, t∗) for some t∗ ∈
(
0, τY (1)
2
]
, then
θ˙1(t
∗) ≥ θ˙2(t∗). Proceed by contradiction. By definition θ1 = θ2 implies that y˙1y1 =
y˙2
y2
. Since
θ1 = θ2, at t∗, the distance from the origin of these points are such that y21+y˙21 < y22+y˙22 , else
the Hamiltonian level sets would be crossing. Those facts together give y2 > y1 (similar
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Figure 3.4: Many instances of x with different TC.
triangles). So
θ˙1(t
∗) = −1+ 1
2
y21
1 +
(
y˙1
y1
)2 = −1+ 12 y21
1 +
(
y˙2
y2
)2 < −1+ 12 y22
1 +
(
y˙2
y2
)2 = θ˙2(t∗), a contradiction.
Thus θ1(t) < θ2(t) for t ∈
(
0, τY (1)
2
]
and hence y1(t) < y2(t) for t ∈
(
0, τY (1)
2
]
. Moreover
by Lemma 3.3.8 yi(t) = yi(τY (i) − t), hence y1(t) = y1(τY (1) − t) < y2(τY (1) − t) <
y2(τY (2)− t) = y2(t) for t ∈
[
τY (1)
2
, τY (1)
)
. Thus y1(t) < y2(t) for t ∈ (0, τY (1)).
It was shown that 0 ≤ y1 < y2, so the inequality x˙2 = y2(x2 − 1) > y1(x2 − 1) holds for
t ∈ (0, τY ()). Since τX() < τY (), if x1 = x2 then x˙2 > y1(x2 − 1) = x˙1 for ∀t ∈ [0, τX(1)].
Hence x2 > x1 for ∀t ∈ [0, τX(1)] (see Fig. 3.4 for the intuition).
The following is immediate, but is stated separately for convenience.
Corollary 3.3.13. The functions τX , τY are monotonically increasing.
Proof. Immediate from the conclusion of Theorem 3.3.12.
Since the solutions (x, y) to (3.8) for x(0) =  ∈ (0, 1) cross the horizontal axis non-
tangentially, as opposed to touching it at a point and then retreating (or "kissing the axis"),
the functions τX , τY are continuous.
Lemma 3.3.14. The functions τX , τY are continuous.
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Proof. Suppose there is a sequence of solutions (xn, yn) to (3.8) and some solution (x, y) to
that system, so that the sequence of initial values xn(0) ∈ [0, 1] converges from above to
some initial value x(0) ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemmas 3.3.8 and 3.3.9 x˙(τX(x(0))), y˙(τY (x(0))) < 0.
Fix δ > 0. For simplicity let τ = τX(x(0)). The proof will show that τX is continuous; the
argument for τY is similar. Since x˙(τ) < 0 and x(τ) = 0, for δ sufficiently small x(τ+δ) < 0.
Then by the Lipschitz conditions xn converges to x, thus there exists an N ∈ N so that
∀n > N , xn(τ + δ) < 0, because x(τ + δ) < 0. Therefore for n > N , τX(xn(0)) < τ + δ and
by Corollary 3.3.13 τ < τX(xn(0)). Since δ was arbitrary, limn→∞ τX(xn(0)) = τ . The same
holds for sequences xn(0) converges from below to x(0). Thus τX is continuous.
The remainder of the proof of Theorem 3.3.3 is shown in Section 3.3.3. The next section
relates to bounding x and y for a short time. Theorem 3.3.1 is proved in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Bounding Asymptotic Solutions
In this section bounds for the solution (x, y) to (3.8) for x(0) =  are derived on subsets
of their domain. Having such bounds for our solutions will allow for an argument of
asymptotic solution for small choices of . These results will assist in finding the ranges
of τX , τY in the next section. The following remark gives intuition about the solutions y
for small .
Remark 3.3.15. Recall (3.8), 
x˙ = −y + x|y|, x(0) =  ∈ [0, 1]
y˙ = x− 1
2
y|y|, y(0) = 0.
Letting x˜ = x/ and y˜ = y/, the above equation becomes
˙˜x = −y˜ + x˜|y˜|, x˜(0) = 1,
˙˜y = x˜− 
2
y˜|y˜|, y˜(0) = 0.
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In the limit  → 0, the solution is y˜(t) = sin(t). Thus y(t) =  sin(t) + o(), but this is not
enough to determine the lower bound of τY . Theorem 3.3.1 can not be proven without knowing the
codomains of τX and τY .
In consideration of Remark 3.3.15, suppose y solves (3.9) for a particular  ∈ (0, 1). Let
z(t) := y(t)−  sin(t). Then 
z¨ = −z + 1
2
(z +  sin(t))3
z(0) = 0, z˙(0) = 0.
(3.17)
Bounds for z give bounds for y, and bounds for z will be found.
Lemma 3.3.16. Let z be a solution to (3.17). Then 0 ≤ z(t) < .33 sin(t) for t ∈ [0, pi/2].
Proof. Let τ be the first strictly positive time such that z¨(τ) = 0. First a bound for z(t)
on t ∈ [0, τ ] is found, then τ > pi/2 is shown. Since z(0) = 0, by (3.17) z¨(0) = 0. Since
z˙(0) = 0 there is a time t ∈ (0, τ) so that  sin(t) > |z(t)|. Suppose that z¨(t) < 0 then
z(t) > 1
2
(z(t) +  sin(t))3 > 0 a contradiction. Thus z¨(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, τ).
Suppose that z(t) ≤ .3 sin(t) for some t ≤ min{τ, pi/2}. Call β = 1
2
(1 + .3)3. Then
z˙(t) =
∫ t
0
z¨(s)ds ≤
∫ t
0
1
2
(.3 sin(t) +  sin(t))3ds
= β3[1− cos(t)− 1
3
(1− cos(t)3)].
Thus
z(t) ≤ β3
∫ t
0
[1− cos(s)− 1
3
(1− cos(s)3)]ds
= β3
[
2
3
t− 2
3
sin(t)− 1
9
sin(t)3
]
(3.18)
< β3(.27)
2
pi
t, by convexity,
< β3(.27) sin(t), again by convexity,
< .33 sin(t).
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Figure 3.5: Graphs of z in green and 0.33 sin(t) in black. The vertical gray line is at pi/2. On the
left  = 0.1 and on the right  = 1.
Which implies that z(t) ≤ .3 sin(t) for all t ≤ min{τ, pi/2}. To show that τ > pi
2
notice that
(9 + 2β) sin(t)3 + 12β sin(t) ≥ (9 + 2) 2
pi
t+ 12
2
pi
t
> 12(1.1)t > 12βt,
which implies that 9 sin(t)3 > 12βt− 2β sin(t)3− 12β sin(t), and multiplying both sides by
3
18
gives that
1
2
3 sin(t)3 > β3
[
2
3
t− 2
3
sin(t)− 1
9
sin(t)3
]
≥ z(t)
for t ≤ min{τ, pi/2} by (3.18). On the other hand by the definition of τ
z(τ) =
1
2
(z(τ) +  sin(t))3 >
1
2
3 sin(τ)3.
Thus τ > pi
2
.
Therefore 0 ≤ z(t) < .33 sin(t) on t ∈ [0, pi/2]; see Fig. 3.5.
Corollary 3.3.17. Suppose y solves (3.9) for a particular  ∈ (0, 1), then
 sin(t) ≤ y(t) ≤  sin(t) + .33 sin(t),∀t ∈ [0, pi/2]. (3.19)
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Proof. Apply Lemma 3.3.16 to the fact that y(t) = z(t) +  sin(t).
The bounds for y are used to find bounds for xwhich solve (3.8) in terms of x(0) ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 3.3.18. Suppose (x, y) solves (3.8) with x(0) =  ∈ (0, 1), then for any t ∈ [0, pi
2
]
,
 cos(t)− .33(1− cos(t)) ≤ x(t) ≤  cos(t) + (2 − .33 + .34)(1− cos(t)) + 1
2
.33t2. (3.20)
Proof. Let x(0) =  ∈ (0, 1). Begin with the lower bound. Notice that y(t) > 0 on t ∈ (0, pi
2
],
hence x˙ = (x− 1)y > −y. By the bound for y given in (3.19) gives that
x(t) ≥ (+ .33) cos(t)− .33.
To find an upper bound consider the second derivative of x for t ∈ [0, pi
2
]
x¨ = −x+ x2 − 1
2
y2 +
1
2
xy2
= (x− 1)
(
x+
1
2
y2
)
≤ (x− 1)x
≤ (− 1)x.
Integrating twice reveals an upper bound. The bound of the first derivative is
x˙(t) =
∫ t
0
x¨(s)ds
≤
∫ t
0
(− 1)x(s)ds
≤
∫ t
0
(− 1)((+ .33) cos(s)− .33)ds
= (− 1) ((+ .33) sin(t)− .33t)
≤ (− 1) (+ .33) sin(t) + .33t
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and hence the bound for x is
x(t) =
∫ t
0
x˙(s)ds
≤
∫ t
0
(− 1)(+ .33) sin(s) + .33sds
= (1− ) (+ .33) (cos(t)− 1) + .153t2
=  cos(t) +
(
2 − .33 + .34) (1− cos(t)) + 0.153t2.
Thus for any t ∈ [0, pi
2
]
,
 cos(t)− .33(1− cos(t)) ≤ x(t) ≤  cos(t) + (2 − .33 + .34) (1− cos(t)) + 1
2
.33t2.
3.3.3 Range of τX and τY
This section is dedicated to finding the ranges of τX , τY . First the range of τY is computed,
using the bounds of y found in Corollary 3.3.17.
Theorem 3.3.19. The following hold
lim
→0+
τY () = pi and lim
→1−
τY () =∞.
Proof. Let {y} be the family of solutions to (3.9) with IC  ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 3.3.7 y1 is
monotonically increasing. By Corollary 3.3.13 τY increases in . Suppose that lim→1− τY () =
t∗ <∞, and proceed by contradiction. By Lemma 3.3.14, τY is continuous and by the Lip-
schitz condition of the ODE,
y1(t
∗) = lim
→1−
y(t
∗) = lim
→1−
y(τY ()) = 0.
39
But y1(t∗) 6= 0, a contradiction, hence
lim
→1−
τY () =∞.
For the first limit, fix  ∈ (0, 1). Let y be the solution to (3.9). Let θ(t) = arctan( y˙
y
). Notice
y
(
τY ()
2
)
− y (pi
2
)
0− y˙ (pi
2
) ≥ 1
dy˙/dy
∣∣∣∣
t=pi
2
, by (3.15).
So by Corollary 3.3.17,  ≤ y (pi
2
) ≤ + .33 for t = pi/2
y
(
τY ()
2
)
≤ y
(pi
2
)
− y˙
(pi
2
) 1
dy˙/dy
∣∣∣∣
t=pi
2
, by (3.15),
= y
(pi
2
)
+ y˙
(pi
2
) y˙ (pi
2
)
y
(
pi
2
)− 1
2
y
(
pi
2
)3 , by y¨,
≤ y
(pi
2
)
+
y˙(0)2
y
(
pi
2
)− 1
2
y
(
pi
2
)3 , since y˙ decreases,
≤ + .33 + 
2

, applying bounds,
< 2.3.
By (3.16)
θ(t) = θ(0) +
∫ t
0
−1 + 1
2
y(s)4
y˙(s)2 + y(s)2
ds, for t ∈
(
0,
pi
2
]
≤ pi
2
− t+ 1
2
∫ t
0
y(s)2ds
≤ pi
2
− t+ 1
2
∫ t
0
y
(
τY ()
2
)2
ds
<
pi
2
+ (62 − 1)t.
So if  <
√
6 and t = pi/2
1−62 then θ(t) < 0 and hence τY () <
pi
1−62 . Recall Lemma 3.3.11,
which showed that τY () > pi.
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Thus
lim
→0+
τY () = pi.
The range of τX is computed, using the bounds of x found in Corollary 3.3.18.
Theorem 3.3.20. The following hold
lim
→0+
τX() =
pi
2
and lim
→1−
τX() =∞.
Proof. Fix  ∈ (0, 1). Let (x, y) be the solution to (3.8) with IC x(0) = . By (3.20) x (pi
2
)
< 22
for sufficiently small . Since x¨ = (x−1) (x+ 1
2
y2
)
< 0 for t ∈ [0, τY ()], x is concave down
on this interval. Thus by concavity, secant slopes decay and so
22 − 
pi/2− 0 >
x
(
pi
2
)− x(0)
pi/2− 0 ≥
x(τX())− x(0)
τX()− 0 =
−
τX()
,
which implies that τX() < pi2 + 2.
Since y˙
(
τY ()
2
)
= 0, y
(
τY ()
2
)
> 0 and y˙ = x − 1
2
y|y| means that x
(
τY ()
2
)
> 0. Thus
τX() > τY ()/2 because x
(
τY ()
2
)
> 0 = x(τX()) and x decreases on [0, τY ()]. Thus
lim
→1−
τX() ≥ lim
→1−
1
2
τY () =∞.
Moreover, τY ()/2 < τX() < pi2 + 2. Thus
lim
→0+
τX() =
pi
2
.
This completes Theorem 3.3.3.
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3.3.4 Number of Solutions for Symmetric 2-State Follow the Crowd
MFG Given Time to Play
It will be shown that the number of different solutions (x, y), over variable IC x(0), of
(3.8) constrained by x(T ) = 0, given T , is a function of the zeros of x. Due to the nature of
the zeros of x, the number of solutions depends on the time to play and the behavior of
the functions τX , τY . Because τX , τY are bijective and continuous it can be shown that the
number of solutions constrained by x(T ) = 0 is determined by the ranges of τX , τY , see
Lemma 3.3.21 and Theorem 3.3.1.
Theorem 3.3.1 gives the number of solutions (θ, u) of the follow the crowd MFG system
given by (3.5) with θ(0) = 1
2
, with time to play T . Using the properties of solutions
(x, y) to (3.8), and properties of continuous bijective functions τX : (0, 1)  (pi2 ,∞) and
τY : (0, 1)  (pi,∞), the number of solutions constrained to x(T ) = 0 can be found given
time to play T .
To that end, a lemma discussing the nature of the zeros of x is explored first.
Lemma 3.3.21. Suppose that (x, y) is a solution to (3.8) with IC x(0) =  ∈ (0, 1). Then x(t) = 0
if and only if t = τX() + kτY () for k ∈ N0.
Proof. Fix k ∈ N0. By Lemma 3.3.9 x(t) = −x(t+ τY ()) for t ≥ 0. Therefore
|x(τX() + kτY ())| = |x(τX())| = 0.
Suppose that t ∈ (0, τY ()) then |x(τX()+kτY ())+t| = |x(τX()+t)|. Hence it suffices to
show that the function x(τX()+ t) has no zeros for t ∈ (0, τY ()). The function x(τX()+ t)
has no zeros for t ∈ (0, τY ()) because x(τX()) = x(τX() + τY ()) = 0 and by Lemma
3.3.9, x is strictly decreasing on (0, τY ()) and strictly increasing on (τY (), 2τY ()). Hence
the conclusion.
The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 follows from Theorem 3.3.3, or rather the individual con-
clusions leading up to Theorem 3.3.3.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. It suffices to count the solutions (x, y) of (3.8), over all initial condi-
tions x(0) =  ∈ [0, 1] such that x(T ) = 0, given T > 0.
Fix k ∈ N and T ∈ (pi
2
+ (k − 1)pi, pi
2
+ kpi
]
. By Theorems 3.3.19 and 3.3.20, for any
n ∈ N0, lim→0+ τX() + nτY () = pi2 + npi. If  ∈ (0, 1) is given then by Lemma 3.3.21,
x(T ) = 0 if and only if there exists n such that τX() + nτY () = T .
Suppose n ≥ k. Then lim→0+ τX() + nτY () = pi2 + npi ≥ pi2 + kpi > T . Since τX , τY
are strictly monotonically increasing functions, τX() + nτY () > T for  ∈ (0, 1). Instead,
suppose n was a negative integer. Then τX() + nτY () < 0 < T for all  ∈ (0, 1) because
τX < τY . Thus if n < 0 or n ≥ k then x(T ) 6= 0 for any  ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose that n is an integer so that 0 ≤ n < k. Then
lim
→0+
τX() + nτY () =
pi
2
+ npi ≤ pi
2
+ (k − 1)pi < T < lim
→1−
τX() + nτY () =∞.
By Lemma 3.3.14, τX + nτY is continuous, so an n exists such that τX(n) + nτY (n) = T .
By Corollary 3.3.13, τX + nτY is monotonic, so the value n where τX(n) + nτY (n) = T is
unique.
By symmetry x(0) = −n for 0 ≤ n < k give the only solutions so that x(T ) = 0 and
x(0) < 0. Finally, for any T > 0, x, y ≡ 0 is a solution of the IVP, this gives one solution,
so x(0) = 0 gives that x(T ) = 0.
Thus there are a total of 1 + 2k solutions.
The solutions of the ITVP initiate as functions identically equal to 1/2, and increase in
magnitude as T increases. Figure 3.6 illustrates all 4 solutions (x, y) such that y(0) > 0
with time to play T = pi(3 + 1
2
) + 0.1. The x and y are plotted together for comparison.
Figure 3.7 indicates which MFG solutions are probably fluid limit trajectories by compar-
ing a realization. Figure 3.8 illustrates the increasing number of solutions described in
Section 3.3, and Fig. 3.6 demonstrates the solutions plotted with their controls.
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Figure 3.6: Consider (3.6) with T = pi(3 + 12) + 0.1 and x(0) = 0 where x = 2θ − 1. For this
amount of running time there are exactly 4 solutions to equation where y(0) > 0. The solutions x
are plotted (in blue) along with the value y := u1 − u0 (in red).
Figure 3.7: On the left, is a set of realizations of the N + 1-player game given by (4.3) with 400
players and various time to play. On the right, are the MFG solutions believed to be the fluid
limit trajectories. By the symmetries the bifurcation set is identically 1/2.
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Figure 3.8: Given are all the solutions to (3.6) with θ(0) = 1/2, given various times to play T , in
consideration of Theorem 3.3.1. Notice the times before and after an increase of the number of
solutions occur.
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4 THE MFG MAP AND STABILITYILLUSTRATIONS
In this chapter, various cost functions will be given in order to illustrate different types
of behavior attained by the 2-state MFG model. Stability of the MFG map for the sym-
metric follow the crowd model from Section 3.3 is analyzed, showing some consistency
with Conjecture 2.3.2. The rest of this chapter after that is dedicated to numerical stability,
including examples of a phenomenon of false positives which are difficult to rectify. Also
see Section 2.3.1 for a version of the MFG map which takes smaller iterations to try to im-
prove convergence, especially when given situations where the MFG map maps between
multiple functions; see Figs. 2.2 and 2.3.
The assumption of 2-states and of the form of the running cost from Section 2.1.1 are
made. Recall the various systems and equations of transition rates.

− d
dt
ui = f(i, θ)− 1
2
(ui − u1−i)2+
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )),
(4.1)
with Markov transition probabilities
P[it+h = 1− i|it = i] = (ui(t)− u1−i(t))+h+ o(h). (4.2)
The cost-to-go functions for the system with N + 1 rational players are determined by
− d
dt
uni = f
(
i,
n
N
)
− 1
2
(uni − un1−i)2++
+ nα∗0,1
(
n− i
N
, u
)
[un+1i − uni ] + (N − n)α∗1,0
(
n+ 1− i
N
, u
)
[un−1i − uni ]
uni (T ) = ψi
( n
N
)
,
(4.3)
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and the transition rates of the N + 1 players are given by
P[it+h = 1− i|nt = n, it = i] = α∗i,1−i
( n
N
, un
)
h+ o(h),
P[nt+h = n− 1|nt = n, it = i] = nα∗0,1
(
n− i
N
, un−i
)
h+ o(h) and
P[nt+h = n+ 1|nt = n, it = i] = (N − n)α∗1,0
(
n+ 1− i
N
, un+1−i
)
h+ o(h). (4.4)
Last, the MFG model is
−u˙0 = f(0, θ)− 1
2
(u0 − u1)2+
−u˙1 = f(1, θ)− 1
2
(u1 − u0)2+
θ˙ = −θ(u0 − u1)+ + (1− θ)(u1 − u0)+
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )), θ(0) = θ¯ ∈ [0, 1].
(4.5)
The rest of this chapter focuses on stability and numerical results.
4.1 Stability of MFG Map for Follow the Crowd Case
Recall the MFG map from Section 2.3, Φ. The MFG map for the case of the follow the
crowd running cost, from Section 3.3, is analyzed. The Gâteaux derivative of the MFG
map is evaluated at the MFG solutions, in order to explore the stability of the solutions.
Consider, from Chapter 3, the follow the crowd MFG model given by (3.5) with some
time to play T . The MFG map can be expressed in terms of the simplified systems. Con-
sider a continuous function x : [0, T ] → [−1, 1] which is considered a prediction to the
fluid limit trajectory and let y be the solution to
−y˙ = x− 1
2
y|y|
y(T ) = 0,
(4.6)
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and given this y let x˜ be the solution to
 ˙˜x = y − x˜|y|x˜(0) = x(0). (4.7)
Define ΦX to be the map which takes x to x˜. Then ΦX(2θ − 1) = 2Φ(θ) − 1, for any
prediction θ.
The Gâteaux derivative for ΦX will be analyzed instead of for Φ. Suppose (x, y) is a
solution to (3.6). Fix tˆ ∈ (0, T ) and  > 0 sufficiently small. Suppose h(t) = δ(t − tˆ). Let
x := x + h. Let y, y be the solution to (4.6) with the x, x : [0, T ] → [−1, 1] respectively.
Let k = 1 (y − y). Then
k˙ = y˙ − y˙
= −x + 1
2
y|y|+ x− 1
2
y|y|
= −h+ 1
2
(y + k)|y + k| − 1
2
y|y|
= −h+ 1
2
(y + k)(|y|+ sgn(y)k)− 1
2
y|y|+ o(2), since y − y = o()
= −h+ k|y|+ o(2) so
k˙ = −h+ k|y|+ o(), with k(T ) = 0.
Hence k(t) = e
∫ t
T |y|dr
∫ t
T
(−h(s) + o())e−
∫ s
T |y|drds = e−
∫ tˆ
t |y|ds1{tˆ>t} + o(). Let x˜ be the
solution to (4.7) with y in place of y, that is x˜ = ΦX(x). Let g = 1 (ΦX(x) − ΦX(x)).
Define the limit functions
k := lim
→0
1

(y − y) and g := lim
→0
1

(ΦX(x+ h)− ΦX(x)).
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Then k(t) = 1{tˆ>t}e−
∫ tˆ
t |y|ds and
˙˜x − x˙ = y − y − x˜|y|+ x|y|
= k − (x+ g)|y + k|+ x|y|
= k − (xksgn(y) + g|y|) + o(2) so
g˙ = k(1− sgn(y)x)− g|y|+ o(), with g(0) = 0.
Thus g(t) = e−
∫ t
0 |y|ds
∫ t
0
k(s)e
∫ s
0 |y|dr(1 − sgn(y)x)ds for the impulse h and given tˆ. The
impulse response is
K(t, tˆ) = e−
∫ t
0 |y|dr
∫ t
0
1{tˆ>s}e
− ∫ tˆs |y|dre∫ s0 |y|dr(1− sgn(y)x)ds
=
∫ t∧tˆ
0
e−
∫ t
0 |y|dre−
∫ tˆ
s |y|dre
∫ s
0 |y|dr(1− sgn(y)x)ds
=
∫ t∧tˆ
0
e−
∫ t
0 |y|dre−
∫ tˆ
0 |y|dre2
∫ s
0 |y|dr(1− sgn(y)x)ds. (4.8)
Therefore for general solutions (x, y), time to play T , and direction h : [0, T ] → R, the
Gâteaux derivative of ΦX is given by the following integral operator:
Lx,y(t) =
∫ T
0
K(t, tˆ)h(tˆ)dtˆ
=
∫ T
0
h(tˆ)
∫ t∧tˆ
0
e−
∫ t
0 |y|dre−
∫ tˆ
0 |y|dre2
∫ s
0 |y|dr(1− sgn(y)x)dsdtˆ. (4.9)
Suppose that x is a strictly monotonic solution, then (1 − sgn(y(t))x(t)) = e−
∫ t
0 |y|ds by
(3.7) and Lemma 3.3.7. Thus K(t, tˆ) =
∫ t∧tˆ
0
e−
∫ t
0 |y|dre−
∫ tˆ
0 |y|dre
∫ s
0 |y|drds which is symmetric
and
Lx,y(t) =
∫ T
0
h(tˆ)
∫ t∧tˆ
0
e−
∫ t
0 |y|dre−
∫ tˆ
0 |y|dre
∫ s
0 |y|drdsdtˆ. (4.10)
The form of (4.10) is relatively simple, and its eigenvalues and eigenfunctions can be
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explicitly found in the following special case. Suppose that x, y ≡ 0 and T > 0. Then
K(t, tˆ) =
∫ t∧tˆ
0
1ds = min{t, tˆ}. So K(t, tˆ) = K(tˆ, t) and K is positive semidefinite because
it is the autocorrelation function for Brownian motion.
Fix integer n ≥ 0. Suppose that hn(t) = sin( (2n+1)pit2T ). Then
Lx,y(t) =
∫ T
0
min{t, tˆ} sin
(
(2n+ 1)pitˆ
2T
)
dtˆ
=
∫ t
0
tˆ sin
(
(2n+ 1)pitˆ
2T
)
dtˆ+
∫ T
t
t sin
(
(2n+ 1)pitˆ
2T
)
dtˆ
=
[(
2T
(2n+ 1)pi
)2
sin
(
(2n+ 1)pitˆ
2T
)
− 2T
(2n+ 1)pi
tˆ cos
(
(2n+ 1)pitˆ
+
2T
)]t
tˆ=0
+
+
[
− 2T
(2n+ 1)pi
t cos
(
(2n+ 1)pitˆ
2T
)]T
tˆ=t
=
(
2T
(2n+ 1)pi
)2
sin
(
(2n+ 1)pit
2T
)
.
Thus by Mercer’s theorem K(t, s) =
∑∞
n=0
(
2T
(2n+1)pi
)2√
2
T
hn(t)
√
2
T
hn(s). The functions√
T
2
hn(t), form an orthonormal basis of functions with the corresponding eigenvalues
λn =
(
2T
(2n+1)pi
)2
. Notice that λ0 ≥ λi for integer i ≥ 0. If T > pi2 then λ0 =
(
2
pi
T
)2
> 1, hence
ΦX is unstable. If T < pi2 then λ0 =
(
2
pi
T
)2
< 1, hence ΦX is stable.
Recall in Section 3.3 it was shown that θ ≡ 1
2
is the unique MFG solution until time to
play exceeds T = pi
2
. In the corresponding N + 1 game if one state contains more players
than the other then every player attempts to move to that state, so the fluid limit trajectory
must be monotone; see Fig. 3.7. That is, the stable points for the MFG map are exactly
the fluid limit trajectory at least for T ∈ (0, 3pi/2]. This is good evidence in support of
Conjecture 2.3.2.
One may agree based on the previous computations that it is difficult to show if the
MFG map is stable at a given MFG solution. But at least Conjecture 2.3.2 is consistent
with the analysis for the case of x ≡ 0.
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4.2 Stability and Fluid Limit Trajectory
This section is devoted to numerical results for the MFG map Φ for the MFG given by
(4.5), with no terminal cost and f(i, θ) = |θ − (1− i)|. That is the system from Section 3.3
where y = u1 − u0, 
−y˙ = 2θ − 1− 1
2
y|y|, y(T ) = 0
θ˙ = (1− θ)y+ − θ(−y)+, θ(0) = θ¯ ∈ [0, 1].
(4.11)
To illustrate Conjecture 2.3.2, the MFG map Φ of (4.11) will be put to the test. Consider
the time to play T = pi
2
+ 0.01, then Φ1000[1
2
+ 1
1000000
sin(t)](T ) ≈ 0.5105, so clearly Φn is not
approaching 1
2
. On the other hand, if T = pi
2
+0.01, then Φ1000[1
2
+ 1
1000000
sin(t)](T ) ≈ 0.5 up
to 16 decimal places. This is consistent with Conjecture 2.3.2 and the eigenvalues of the
map ΦX about x ≡ 0 found in Section 4.1, because λ0 =
(
2T
pi
)2. Recall that for T = pi
2
+0.01,
λ0 > 1 and hence Φ is unstable about 12 ; and for T =
pi
2
+ 0.01, λ0 < 1 and hence Φ is stable
about 1
2
.
Consider a large time to play, say T = 20, so that multiple MFG solutions exist. The
aforementioned conjecture implies that only the monotone solution may be stable, be-
cause as discussed the fluid limit trajectories are monotone. Consider two MFG solutions
(θ1, y1) and (θ2, y2) to (4.11), as shown in Fig. 4.1. Conjecture 2.3.2 indicates that the MFG
map Φ is stable about θ1 and unstable about θ2. The following norms were computed nu-
merically ‖θ2 − Φ1000(θ2 + 0.0001)‖2 = 5.8 ∗ 10−07, ‖θ2 − Φ2000(θ2 + 0.0001)‖2 = 2.9 ∗ 10−10
and ‖θ2 − Φ3000(θ2 + 0.0001)‖2 < 1 ∗ 10−16; indicating stability. This does not bode well for
Conjecture 2.3.2.
Let us consider adding noise between iterations, to test stability of Φ at θ2 another way.
Let W n be independent Wiener processes for each n ∈ N, and define the process Mnt :=
W n0.05t so that the variance of Mnt −Mns is 0.05(t−s). Then define θn+12 := Φ(θn2 +Mn), with
θ12 := θ2. Figure 4.2 is a visual aid showing the extent of stability Φ even in the presence
of noise. The plots are of the first 100 iterations showing the before and after affects of the
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Figure 4.1: The MFG solution on the left is most likely a fluid limit trajectory, and hence by
Conjecture 2.3.2 is stable. The MFG solution on the right passes through the value 1/2, thus by
Conjecture 2.3.2 is unstable.
Figure 4.2: On the left are the predictions with noise θn2 +M
n. On the right are the plots of θn+12
(i.e. Φ(θn2 +M
n)). This is done for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 100}.
map Φ. The functions plotted are θn2 + Mn and θ
n+1
2 , and the thick line indicates the last
iteration, for the purpose of perspective.
Consider the last iteration, θ1012 and let θ∗ := Φ5000(θ1012 ). Numerical computations give
that ‖θ∗ − Φ1000(θ∗)‖2 < 1 ∗ 10−16 indicating stability, and yet ‖θ2 − θ∗‖2 = 1.734. The plots
of θ2 and θ∗ are given in Fig. 4.3. Since θ∗ 6= θ2 and crosses the value 1/2 only once, it
cannot be a MFG and hence it cannot be a fixed point, yet it appears to be not only a
fixed point but a stable one. This would mean that Φ is stable at a non-fixed point, which
is absurd, and thus is nothing more than a numerical anomaly. Thus the local stability
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Figure 4.3: In orange is θ2 and in blue θ∗ := Φ5000(θ1012 ) for given some realization.
Figure 4.4: On the left are the predictions with noise θn2 +M
n. On the right are the plots of θn+12
(i.e. Φ(θn2 +M
n)). This is done for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 1000} and some realization. Opacity is added to
illustrate the number of overlaying trajectories.
indicated numerically at θ2 before may be a result of this same numerical phenomenon,
and Conjecture 2.3.2 may indeed hold. For no other reason but to give an intuition, lets
evaluate θn2 for more values of n; see Fig. 4.4. Figure 4.5 gives two different realizations of
θ3012 and then, showing each iteration, finds the limit of Φn(θ3012 ) to be ±θ1, the other fluid
limit trajectories. This figure indicates that the domain of attraction due to the numerical
phenomenon is quite small.
To illustrate stability for the monotone increasing solution significantly more noise is
added between the iterations of Φ. Recall the independent Wiener processes W n and
define the processes Nnt := W n0.2t so that the variance of Nnt −Nns is 0.2(t− s). Then define
53
Figure 4.5: The two plots are two different realizations. In thick blue is θ3012 , the rest are Φ
n(θ3012 ),
this is done for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10000}. The plot on the left shows Φn(θ3012 ) approaching −θ1 and the
plot on the right shows Φn(θ3012 ) approaching θ1 Opacity is added to illustrate time spent.
θn+11 := Φ(θ
n
1 + N
n), with θ11 := θ1. Figure 4.6 shows θn1 + Nn for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 200}, and it
can be seen that even with higher variance the functions θn1 are relatively close. Moreover,
the value ‖θ1 − Φ1000(θ2001 )‖2 < 1 ∗ 10−16 based on numerics, giving a strong indication of
stability. Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, indicate that the fluid limit trajectory may be stable with
a wide domain of attraction.
Consider solutions to (4.11) with time to play T = 50. For time to play being this large,
pseudo-stable fixed points exist which appear to be numerically close to a piece-wise
combination of two different MFG solutions. Call the dashed green curve in Fig. 4.7, θ.
The function Φ1000(θ), which is plotted in dark green on the right, appears to be a fixed
point as ‖Φ2000(θ)− Φ1000(θ)‖ < 1∗ 10−16. These examples indicate some of the difficulties
which will arise in MFGs when uniqueness is not guaranteed.
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Figure 4.6: In thick blue θ2001 +N
200. The rest are θn1 +N
n. This is done for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 199}.
Opacity is added to illustrate the number of overlaying trajectories.
Figure 4.7: The plot to the left has three functions. In blue and orange are two solutions to (4.11).
In green, θ, is a curve that starts off following the orange curve somewhat closely and then
follows the blue curve. The plot to the left in dark green is Φ1000(θ).
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4.3 Indifference Sets and Heat Maps
This section gives examples of the 2-state MFG given by (4.5) with various running and
terminal costs. With each example are heat maps associated with the cost-to-go function
given by the N + 1 player game described by (4.3). These examples give a visual of the
cost-to-go functions, which gives an idea of what the fluid limit trajectories may look like.
Consider (4.3) with time to play T > 0. Also consider the map
t 7→ {n : un1 (t)− un0 (t) > 0 and un+11 (t)− un+10 (t) < 0}/(N + 1),
denoted ηNT . Recall that there is a dependency for u
n
0 and un1 on N , which is dropped from
the notation. Suppose that limN→∞ ηNT converges to say ηT . Then the indifference set is
exactly the set of points (T − t, ηT (t)) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and for any T > 0.
Below are figures of many examples, with different running and terminal costs. In the
first two examples, the fluid limit trajectories are plotted over the heat map of un1 (t) −
un0 (t) starting at the indifference curve to illustrate how the two relate; see Figs. 4.8 and
4.10. The next example is of a prisoners’ dilemma with social pressure running cost, this
example is interesting because the indifference curve crosses 1/2; see Fig. 4.11. Also
illustrated is a sequence of indifference curves converging, ηNT , converges pointwise; see
Fig. 4.12.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show two examples with follow the crowd running cost but also
with the same non-constant terminal cost added to both states. Certainly the MFG solu-
tions are the same as if no terminal costs were added because the difference of the terminal
costs over the states is zero. What is interesting about these figures is how the fluid limit
trajectories follow the level sets of the heat map of un0 fairly well. The last heat maps cor-
respond with the example given in Section 2.3.1. In each figure N = 400 except in Fig.
4.12. The red/blue plots below, the line where the red meets the blue from above (red
over blue in the red and blue plots) is the indifference curve.
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Figure 4.8: The fluid limit trajectories which are MFG solutions overlaid on the cost-to-go
difference un1 − un0 . Notice the relationship between the colors from the heat map and the
derivative of the curves.
Figure 4.9: Cost-to-go heat maps for follow the crowd example. No terminal costs, and
f(i, θ) = |θ − (1− i)|. Cost-to-go values for both states are shown in the top two plots
respectively. Bottom left is the difference, and bottom right is the sign of the difference.
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Figure 4.10: Cost-to-go heat maps for follow the crowd example with terminal cost on one state.
Terminal cost of 0.3 for all players in state 1 and no terminal cost for players in state 0. Running
cost has f(i, θ) = |θ − (1− i)|. Note how only the existence of a terminal cost explains why the
curve of the graph in sgn(un1 − un0 ) drops so quickly, for small time to go.
58
Figure 4.11: Cost-to-go heat maps for an example with follow the crowd tendency with a
prisoners’ dilemma cost added in. The prisoners’ dilemma associated cost is such that state 0 is
the cooperative state and state 1 is the greedy state. No terminal cost exists. The social pressure
cost is given by |1− i− θ|, the cooperative cost is given by 0.6θ, and the individual incentive cost
is given by 0.31i=0. Running cost has f(i, θ) = |1− i− θ| − 0.6θ + 0.31i=0.
Figure 4.12: Illustration of the pointwise convergence of the indifference set shown in Fig. 4.11.
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Figure 4.13: Cost-to-go heat maps for follow the crowd example with terminal cost for each state
given by 3 cos(4pi nN )
2. Running cost has f(i, θ) = |θ − (1− i)|.
60
Figure 4.14: Cost-to-go heat maps for follow the crowd example with terminal cost for each state
given by 3 sin(4pi nN )
2. Running cost has f(i, θ) = |θ − (1− i)|.
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Figure 4.15: Cost-to-go heat maps for an example with follow the crowd tendency with a
congestion cost for extreme imbalance. No terminal cost exists. Running cost has
f(i, θ) = |1− i− θ|+ 8(θ − 0.75)1{θ>0.75} + 8(0.25− θ)1{θ<0.25}.
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5 CONCLUSION
In Chapter 3 two tractable examples of 2-state MFGs are investigated, one having unique
solutions and the other having non-unique solutions. When dealing with non-unique
solutions they begin as the fluid limit trajectory for short enough time to play, but as the
time to play increases these solutions continued past the bifurcation curve and lose their
relevance to the original game.
Analysis of an example in Sections 3.3 and 4.1 was given which showed that Conjecture
2.3.2 holds for T ∈ (0, 3pi/2] in this example. The numerical phenomenon investigated in
Chapter 4 displays numerical stability for points which are not analytically fixed points.
This makes Conjecture 2.3.2 difficult to dismiss based on numerics alone.
In Section 4.2, however, an example is thoroughly explored indicating that even if Con-
jecture 2.3.2 were true, numerical methods based on it have limited practical value. A
better numerical method for finding the fluid limit trajectories may be to discretize the
derivative of the MFG map and check its eigenvalues; this was not investigated in this
thesis.
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